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Executive Summary
Tax benefits to  owner- occupied housing provide incentives to consume 
housing, offsetting weaker disincentives of the property tax. These ben-
efits also help counter the penalty federal taxes impose on households 
who work in productive high- wage areas, but reinforce incentives to con-
sume local amenities. We simulate the effects of these benefits in a param-
eterized model, and determine the consequences of various tax reforms. 
Reductions in housing tax benefits generally increase efficiency in con-
sumption, but reduce efficiency in location decisions, unless they are ac-
companied by tax rate reductions. The most efficient policy would elimi-
nate most tax benefits to housing and index taxes to local wage levels.
Keywords: Federal taxation, general equilibrium tax incidence, geographic 
inequality, locational efficiency, mortgage interest deduction, cost of living, 
tax reform. 
JEL Classification: H24, H5, H77, R1.
I. Introduction
Since its inception, the federal tax code has given preferred status to 
housing, particularly housing occupied by owners. Today, this pre-
ferred status manifests itself in several ways. First and foremost,  owner- 
 occupiers do not report imputed housing rents—that is, rents they effectively 
receive as their own landlords—as taxable income. Yet, mortgage interest 
costs up to $1 million of debt on primary and secondary homes are deduct-
ible from taxable income. 1 Second, capital gains from home sales of up to 
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$500,000 for married couples, and $250,000 for singles, are excluded from 
taxable income. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projects 
that these benefits to home owners will result in foregone tax revenues—or 
“tax expenditures”—for the 2014 fiscal year of over $200 billion,2 equal to 
14% of federal income tax revenues.3 Similar tax expenditures cost state 
governments billions of dollars in foregone income tax revenues. There 
are also implicit reductions in sales tax revenues, as new homes and home 
improvements are not subject to sales taxes.4 
Recent shortfalls in government revenues and increases in top mar-
ginal tax rates have caused some policymakers to question whether 
the preferred treatment of housing should be revoked in order to raise 
revenues or lower marginal rates (e.g., Bartlett 2013). In 2005, the Presi-
dent’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform proposed replacing the mortgage 
interest deduction (MID) with a 15% credit, and limiting applicable 
mortgages based on regional housing prices. Similar ideas have been 
echoed in the tax reform proposal put forth in 2010 by the National 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (i.e., the “Simpson- 
Bowles Commission”).5 The recent boom and bust of housing prices 
and its impact on the economy has further raised awareness of the tax 
treatment of housing. Many economists believe that eliminating the 
 mortgage- interest deduction would deleverage investments in hous-
ing and lead to greater housing price stability (e.g., Green 2011). At the 
same time, policymakers remain leery of reforming housing tax ben-
efits while prospects for the housing market and the general economy 
remain uncertain.
Housing-related tax reforms tend to be quite popular with econo-
mists, and unpopular with the public at large. In a recent National Tax 
Association (NTA) poll of tax economists, 77% favor repealing the MID 
(Michigan News 2013). A poll of real estate economists and similar ex-
perts by Zillow indicates that a majority want to repeal the MID; only 
11% favor keeping the MID in its current form (Pulsenomics 2012). 
The electorate seem to want to keep tax benefits for housing: the NTA 
poll found that only 10% of the public favors repealing the MID. In a 
United Technologies (2013) poll, 61% of Americans indicate that it is 
“very important” to preserve the MID, holding it in higher regard than 
the deduction for charitable contributions. The support for the MID in 
polls is somewhat surprising, as only 24% of tax filers in 2011 deducted 
any mortgage interest on their tax return.6 In a more nuanced poll by 
Pew (2012), the public was evenly split on whether the MID should be 
limited in order to reduce the debt. Unless economists have different 
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values than the population at large, the tax treatment of housing may be 
an issue where better understanding could bridge the gap in opinion, 
making policy reforms more realistic.
The consequences of housing’s tax- preferred status have received 
considerable attention in the economic literature (see Rosen (1979a), 
Mills (1987), Poterba (1992), Green and Reshovsky (1999), and Hanson 
(2012) for examples). Housing benefits are distributed regressively, with 
high income households receiving greater benefits because of their high 
rates of home ownership, more expensive houses, and higher marginal 
tax rates (see Poterba and Sinai 2011). In theory, lowering the cost of 
housing through tax benefits could encourage home ownership, which 
some argue produces positive externalities worthy of subsidization. 
Home ownership seems to increase exterior maintenance and voter 
participation, and may benefit children (see Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) 
for a summary). The limited scope of externalities considered in these 
studies makes the case for large subsidies tenuous, as does the empiri-
cal evidence that tax benefits in their current form do little to encourage 
home ownership (e.g., Hanson 2012). 
Most of the literature on the consequences of housing tax benefits 
focuses on how they affect investment in housing capital, its price, 
and the leveraging of mortgage debt. These studies sometimes ignore 
how property taxes discourage the consumption of housing if buying 
a larger home does not result in proportionately larger benefits in local 
services paid for by those taxes. Furthermore, they usually ignore the 
preferential sales tax treatment of housing, discussed in Hall (1996).
Far less attention has been given to the issue of how housing tax ben-
efits may influence where households choose to live, work, and enjoy 
local amenities. Gyourko and Sinai (2003, 2004) demonstrate that the 
geographic distribution of housing tax benefits is strongly tilted to-
ward areas where housing prices, income levels, and home ownership 
rates are high, and that this distribution is quite stable over time. How-
ever, providing the distribution of benefits does not show how loca-
tion choices are influenced by these benefits, or how they operate in 
the larger context of a  location- distorting income tax. Albouy (2009a) 
argues that taxes on labor income discourage households from living in 
places where wage levels are high, while tax benefits encourage house-
holds to live where price levels are high. Tax benefits to housing implic-
itly provide a form of cost- of- living adjustment in the federal tax code. 
Such an adjustment may offset disincentives to live in high- wage areas 
if price levels are positively related to wages, or magnify them if prices 
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are negatively related to wages. A positive relation will occur when 
price variation is driven by the relative productivity of firms, while a 
negative relation will occur when prices are driven by relative differ-
ences in  quality- of- life amenities. As a result, tax benefits to housing 
will mitigate the tax penalty of working in an area with  better- paying 
jobs, but augment the implicit tax subsidy given to workers who accept 
lower pay to live in the most desirable areas.
Empirically, wage and price levels exhibit a strong positive correla-
tion across American metropolitan areas. As a result, indexing taxes to 
local  costs- of- living tends to reduce locational inefficiency by reducing 
tax burdens in high- wage areas, albeit imperfectly. Thus, tax benefits to 
housing generally improve efficiency of location choices, even though 
they reduce efficiency of housing investment and consumption choices. 
Besides considering the impact on location, this chapter makes a 
number of other additions to the literature on the tax benefits to hous-
ing. We estimate the degree to which housing may be inefficiently 
consumed relative to nonhousing goods by taking into account prop-
erty taxes on housing and sales taxes on nonhousing consumption. In 
addition, we relax the typical assumption of perfectly elastic housing 
supply. Instead, we incorporate local variation in the elasticity of hous-
ing supply to provide more accurate measures of efficiency costs in 
housing consumption and worker locations. We also consider how tax 
reforms, such as eliminating benefits for housing or indexing taxes to 
local wage levels, would affect local housing costs, employment, and 
the efficiency of housing consumption and locational choice across the 
country.7 
Our simulation results imply that the existing system of income taxa-
tion with tax benefits to housing caused the typical house to be 4% too 
large in 2007, creating an annual deadweight loss of $7 billion.8 Without 
any tax benefits in the income tax code, houses would instead be 2% 
too small because of property taxes, causing an efficiency loss of $2 bil-
lion. Our simulations show that 15% of the population is inefficiently 
located at a cost $26 billion annually. Eliminating the mortgage interest 
and property tax deductions would reduce the inefficiency cost in hous-
ing consumption by about $3.5 billion, and increase the inefficiency cost 
from locational choices by less than $1 billion, so that on net such a re-
form would improve efficiency. Eliminating the favorable capital gains 
treatment in addition would produce no additional gains, as costs in inef-
ficient location choices would offset any further reductions in consump-
tion inefficiency. More efficient reforms would eliminate housing benefits 
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altogether and deflate taxable income by local  costs- of- living or local 
wage levels.
The remainder of the paper begins with a presentation of models 
that incorporate income taxes into location and housing consumption 
choice. The models produce equations for the deadweight loss caused 
by the tax code’s interaction with these markets. We then calibrate the 
models using data on wages, home prices, and location characteristics 
from the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Internal Rev-
enue Service ZIP code file. We use the calibrated model to present dead-
weight loss estimates under the current income tax regime and simulate 
the deadweight loss effects of several tax reforms.
II. Modeling Locational and Housing Consumption Inefficiency
A. How Taxes Alter the Location Choice Decision
We model the relationship between taxes, housing benefits, and lo-
cation choice using the general equilibrium framework of Albouy 
(2009a), which adds federal taxes to the Rosen (1979) and Roback 
(1982) model of wages, amenities, and housing costs. In this frame-
work, households must purchase housing in the city where they live 
and work; cities are effectively metropolitan areas. We assume that 
households are fully mobile across cities and have homogenous tastes. 
Firms hire labor, capital, and land to produce local housing goods, as 
well as goods that are tradable across cities, which we assume have 
the same price everywhere. The second main assumption is that these 
firms make zero profits, paying factors their marginal products. These 
strong equilibrium assumptions make the framework best suited for 
understanding outcomes over the long run and when applied to  cross- 
sectional data. 
Cities vary in two essential attributes, the productivity of their firms, 
and the quality of life they offer to residents. Through the twin assump-
tions that households are mobile and firms make zero profits, firm pro-
ductivity and quality of residential life simultaneously determine hous-
ing prices and wages in each city. Because households are mobile, they 
will pay more for housing in cities where wages are high or where qual-
ity of life is exceptional. Firms will pay higher prices for land in areas 
where wages are low, or productivity is high. 
We demonstrate this model and its consequences for the distortionary 
effect of taxes in figures 1 and 2, in a simplified setting where we equate 
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housing purchased by households with land purchased by firms.9 Figure 
1 illustrates the case for cities that vary in productivity. Consider two 
cities, Nashville and Chicago. Both cities offer the national average qual-
ity of life, but Chicago has  above- average productivity. Each city has 
 downward- sloping zero profit curves for firms, as firms bid less for land 
in cities with higher wages. Chicago’s zero profit curve is above Nash-
ville’s, as firms pay more to be in a highly productive area. The mobility 
condition for workers slopes upward, as workers bid more to live in 
cities where wages are high. The intersection between the zero- profit 
and the mobility conditions, that is, the bid curves for firms and house-
holds, determines the equilibrium prices and wages. More productive 
cities, like Chicago at  E0
C, offer higher wages and charge higher prices, 
than in less productive cities, like Nashville at  E.
Federal taxes on wages reduce the net earnings a worker gains when 
moving from a low- wage to a high- wage city. This reduces the willing-
ness to pay of households to live in higher wage cities. In the graph, 
income taxes rotate the mobility condition clockwise. If we compare 
the effect of an income tax relative to a neutral lump- sum tax, the rota-
Fig. 1. Equilibrium prices and wages in cities that vary in productivity with income 
taxes and housing benefits: Nashville and Chicago
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tion occurs through Nashville, since Nashville pays the same amount with 
either tax.10 Therefore income taxes increase the equilibrium wage and re-
duce the equilibrium price in Chicago relative to Nashville. When there 
is any elasticity in the supply or demand for local land, federal taxes also 
cause the equilibrium population in Chicago to fall. These losses are offset 
by higher population levels in places with  below- average productivity.11 
The location distortion from income taxes may be undone by index-
ing federal taxes to local wage levels. Suppose that a typical advertising 
agent gets paid $60,000 in Nashville and $90,000 in Chicago. Agents 
face a flat marginal tax rate of 33.3% on labor income. To simplify mat-
ters, suppose government revenues are redistributed lump- sum so that 
workers everywhere receive $20,000. Then, an agent in Nashville pays 
on net zero to the government, but is subjected to a $10,000 penalty for 
moving to Chicago, dulling her incentive to move there. An ideal wage 
index would tell us that advertisers are paid 50% more in Chicago. If 
taxable income was deflated using this index, then the advertiser would 
be taxed only on $60,000 in Chicago, and not face any tax penalty for 
moving.12
Federal tax benefits to housing increase the bid households are will-
ing to pay for higher wages or quality of life, since a higher bid results 
in a lower tax burden. Graphically, the mobility condition with housing 
benefits, shown by the shorter dashed curve in figure 1, is rotated coun-
terclockwise relative to the zero mobility condition with income taxes. 
This moves the equilibrium wage back down and the price back up to 
 EC, producing an outcome closer to the initial neutral tax equilibrium at 
 E0
C. With a federal income tax in place, the housing tax benefit helps 
undo the tax distortion created by the income tax. Both the distortion 
from the income tax and the correction from housing tax benefits (as-
suming it is a deduction) increase with a household’s marginal tax rate. 
Following the example of the advertising agent above, consider 
that she pays $20,000 more a year for a house in Chicago relative to a 
comparable one in Nashville. Now suppose that  three- quarters of this 
amount can be deducted from her income taxes (some taxes on labor 
income, such as payroll, do not allow for such deductions). Then, the 
agent would receive one third of $15,000 back in her taxes, $5,000 help-
ing to offset the $10,000 income tax penalty from working in Chicago. If 
housing is the only good that varies in price across cities, then a 100% 
deduction of housing expenditures would completely undo the location 
distortions income taxes induce across cities that vary in productivity. 
With more than one good that varies in price across cities, location 
70 Albouy and Hanson
distortions of this kind could be undone by deflating income levels 
by an ideal cost- of- living index, which would reflect the cost house-
holds bear for locating in  higher- wage locations. For the advertising 
agent, costs of living are one- third higher for the agent, as they offset 
her  after- tax income gain of $20,000 in Chicago relative to $60,000 in 
Nashville (assuming she pays zero taxes net of her lump-sum refund). 
The tax system will be geographically neutral if workers with the same 
 after- tax real incomes pay the same in taxes. Once in a tax- neutral 
equilibrium, a cost-of-living adjustment is fairly straightforward and 
equivalent to a wage-level adjustment. For example, say making taxes 
neutral lowers the agent’s salary from $90,000 to $87,000 and raises her 
extra housing expenditures from $20,000 to $27,000. Both the cost- of- 
living and wage index would then be 45% higher in Chicago than in 
Nashville.
When cities vary in quality of life, instead of productivity, cost- of- 
living adjustments and tax benefits make location decisions less, rather 
than more, efficient. Figure 2 demonstrates how federal income taxes 
and housing tax benefits change the locational equilibrium for two cit-
ies that vary by residential quality of life. Miami has above average 
quality of life, and Nashville has average quality of life. Here, both 
Nashville and Miami share the same zero- profit condition for firms, as 
they both have average productivity. Because quality of life is higher 
in Miami, households there bid more for the price of housing than in 
Nashville at every wage level. They are willing to consumer fewer di-
Fig. 2. Equilibrium prices and wages in cities that vary in quality of life with income 
taxes and housing benefits: Nashville and Miami
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rectly purchasable market goods to consume nonmarket goods, such 
as beaches and sunshine. Such nonmarket goods are scarce and indi-
rectly paid for through the land market. Graphically, Miami’s mobility 
condition is shifted up to reflect this higher bid. In equilibrium, nicer 
 quality- of- life cities, like Miami, charge higher prices and offer lower 
wages than less desirable cities, like Nashville. 
Federal taxes soften the pay cut that households endure for living 
in a nicer city. For example, a bartender that takes a $3,000 pay cut to 
relocate from Nashville to Miami may only experience a $2,000 pay cut 
after taxes. This income tax effect rotates the mobility conditions for 
both  quality- of- life levels clockwise, from the case of a neutral lump- 
sum tax, around cities with average national wage. As in the previous 
example, house prices and wages remain stable in Nashville. However, 
in Miami home prices are bid up, and wages are bid down, as more 
residents migrate into the city from below average  quality- of- life loca-
tions. Employers who locate in beach towns or other amenable loca-
tions are effectively offering their workers an untaxed fringe benefit. 
Workers end up passing this benefit on to landowners in the form of 
higher rents.
Tax benefits to housing increase the bid households pay in areas with 
higher quality of life, rotating the mobility condition counterclockwise 
around the average price level. In Miami, this further increases the price 
of housing and lowers the wage households are willing to endure to en-
joy a higher quality of life. Across cities that differ in quality of life, tax 
benefits to housing exacerbate the spatial distortion caused by federal 
income taxes on labor.13
The formal model, detailed in Albouy (2009a), produces a federal tax 
differential for each city, defined as the additional taxes paid by house-
hold in location j relative to the national average as a fraction of average 
income. It uses a representative household model, which under certain 
assumptions may be used to approximate the economy using an aver-
age of households weighted by their income. Differences in federal tax 
burdens across cities may be neatly approximated by log linearizing a 
federal tax schedule and applying the envelope conditions implied by 
household mobility and zero profits. This approximation produces the 
following locational “tax differential” or “tax distortion,” expressed as 
a fraction of household income.
 
 
d j
m
=  ' swwˆ j − fshpˆ j (1)
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Here, m is average household income,   ' is the marginal tax rate,  wˆ
j and 
 pˆ
j are log wage and price differentials relative to the national average, 
 sw  is the share of income from labor,  f  is the fraction of itemizers, σ is 
the percent reduction in housing costs, and  sh is the share of income 
spent on housing. This value may be positive or negative, depending 
on whether a city pays more or less than the national average.
By making high- wage cities less attractive, federal taxes induce 
workers and businesses to move away from high- wage cities toward 
low- wage ones. This causes an efficiency loss from misallocating work-
ers across areas. The employment effect of a differential tax can be writ-
ten as  ∆ Nˆ
j =  j ⋅ d j / m, where  ∆ Nˆ
j is the change in log employment 
due to mobility,  and  
j  is  the elasticity of local 
employment with respect to a local, uncompensated tax, written as a 
percent of total income. In principle,  reduced- form estimates of this 
elasticity can be estimated or calibrated from a structural theoretical 
model.
Because workers locate in response to federal income taxes, the re-
sulting spatial distribution of employment and population is inefficient, 
or “locationally inefficient” (Wildasin, 1980). Consistent with Harberger 
(1964), this deadweight loss, expressed as a fraction of national income, 
is proportional to half the size of the tax differential times the induced 
change in migration, averaged across cities.
 
 
DWL
National Income
= 1
2
E ∆ Nˆ j d
j
m( ) = 2 ⋅ Var d
j
m( ) (2)
Whatever the distribution of city attributes, this formula captures the 
entire efficiency loss from all of the distortions created by unequal geo-
graphic taxation, including the indirect distortion on the location of 
capital. This equation assumes that city attributes are unaffected by city 
population levels. 
If housing is the only local good, providing a full cost of living adjust-
ment by indexing taxable income to local price levels would be equiva-
lent to setting  f = 1,   = ' in equation (1). In this case, only differences 
in real incomes would be taxed. In equilibrium, this would occur only 
across households in cities that vary in quality of life. In other words, 
a full cost- of- living indexation would eliminate the tax incentive to 
leave productive cities for unproductive ones, but would preserve the 
incentive to leave low  quality- of- life cities for high quality ones. In ef-
fect, the tax benefits to housing provide a partial cost- of- living index for 
those who claim it. Replacing the tax benefits to housing with an equiv-
Are Houses Too Big or In the Wrong Place? 73
alent partial cost- of- living index would create similar incentives for 
renters and nonitemizers. It would also reduce the marginal incentive to 
consume housing, discussed in the next section.
To completely prevent taxes on labor from distorting location deci-
sions, taxable labor income would need to be indexed by an ideal mea-
sure of local wage levels. Such an index should account for how the 
income of workers depends on where they live, and effectively control 
for local characteristics of the workforce. As households are inherently 
different, producing such an index would be difficult. Empirically, how-
ever, wage rates across different types of workers by education, experi-
ence, gender, race, and occupation do appear to be strongly correlated 
across cities.
B. How Taxes Alter the Housing Consumption Decision 
Here we consider how tax benefits affect housing consumption relative 
to other kinds of consumption, in a partial equilibrium setting. Besides 
taking into account federal housing benefits, we also incorporate state 
and local policies that are rarely considered at the same time. The most 
important of these are local property taxes, which matter if they act as 
an excise tax on the margin. We also consider the absence of sales taxes 
on new housing purchases or the labor component of improvements. 
We begin with how taxes affect the effective price of additional hous-
ing, for example, the incentive to consume additional square footage 
or a second bathroom, within a given neighborhood. The effective ad 
valorem subsidy created for housing consumption in area j is: 
   j = 1 − UCPreferred / UCNeutral( ) + S (3)
where 
 
UCPreferred is the user cost of housing with special tax consider-
ations,  UCNeutral is the user cost of housing without them, and  S is the 
state sales tax.14 
To calculate the user cost of housing with and without special treat-
ment in the tax code we use a model similar to Poterba and Sinai 2008 
and 2011.15 This user cost model adds to previous versions by consid-
ering the housing- specific risk premium as a cost to borrowers, while 
recognizing that buyers benefit from the reduction in risk associated 
with being able to prepay or default.16 Thus, the model excludes the 
mortgage interest rate in excess of the risk- free rate as a cost. Our no- 
tax baseline is the user cost of housing without differential tax treat-
ment, removing the mortgage interest deduction, property taxes, and 
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taxing capital gains. The user cost model without differential tax treat-
ment for housing is:
  UCNeutral = rT +  + m + d − 1 − CG( )  (4)
where  rT  is the risk- free interest rate,   is a housing specific risk pre-
mium,  m is annual maintenance and  d is depreciation costs. In keeping 
tax neutral treatment, we include a tax on housings capital gain. The 
capital gain itself is represented by price inflation,  ( ), and is subject to 
the capital gains tax rate, 
 
CG. 
To see how changing the tax treatment of housing creates deadweight 
loss, we also need a variant of the user cost model that reflects cur-
rent law tax treatment. We add in property taxes, the mortgage interest 
deduction, as well as the deduction for property taxes to the user cost 
equation in (4). In adding the differential tax parameters, we consider 
that the full mortgage interest rate is deductible,17 while only the inter-
est rate in excess of the risk- free rate is a cost. We also consider that 
property taxes may be considered as either excise taxes or benefit taxes. 
See Miezkowski (1972) for a full explanation of the excise view of prop-
erty taxes; also see Zodrow (2001) for an explanation of the difference 
(and reconciliation) of competing views of property taxation.18 With 
these considerations, and current tax treatment, the user cost of hous-
ing with preferential tax treatment is:
 
 
UCPreferred = 1 − D 1 − s( )  + Y 1 − ( ){ }( ) rT + 1 − Y( )
−D 1 − s( )  rM − rT( ) + m + 1 − D − k( ) P − 
 (5)
where 
 
Y is the marginal income tax rate applying to investment in-
come,19   is the share of the home financed with debt,  D represents the 
marginal income tax rate applying to deductions,  rM represents the 
mortgage interest rate, and 
 
P is local property taxes. We also include 
the current limit on mortgage interest deductibility, set at $1 million in 
the  s parameter. This parameter follows Anderson, Clemens, and Han-
son (2007), and represents the average share of mortgage that exceeds 
the current law cap. The parameter,  k, also an innovation to the user 
cost model added by Poterba and Sinai (2011) allows flexibility in view-
ing the property tax as a benefit tax or an excise tax. If the property tax 
is completely a benefit tax, then  k = 1, and we are left with only the 
deduction portion; if  k = 0, then the property tax is completely an ex-
cise tax and the full cost (minus deduction) is included. This representa-
tion ignores the limit on the exclusion for capital gains taxation on 
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housing assets. For practical purposes, we expect that leaving out the 
limit on capital gains, $250,000 for singles and $500,000 for married fil-
ers, will not change our simulation results appreciably. In principle, we 
could include this limit in our model, but with no known data source to 
parameterize this limit, we cannot include it in simulations.
To estimate the excess burden from preferential tax treatment on 
housing consumption, we start with a standard deadweight loss equa-
tion (Rosen, 1979a, Poterba, 1992). The excess burden on housing con-
sumption that results from the tax code is:
  DWL / Income = 1 / 2
( )  j sy j2 (6)
where  sh represents the share of income spent on housing, and   j
2 repre-
sents the squared value of the change in the cost of housing services 
induced by differential tax treatment. One departure we make from 
previous studies is that we relax the assumption that housing supply is 
perfectly inelastic. Accordingly, we incorporate local housing supply 
elasticities into our measure of deadweight loss by defining 
 
 j  as the 
harmonic sum of minus the compensated price elasticity of demand, –
 
cd, 
and the local housing supply elasticity, 
 
 j
s, or 
 
 j = −cd js / −cd +  js( ).
III. Calibrating the Model and Examining its Validity 
A. Parameterization and Calibration
To make our models useful for simulation, we need to assign values to 
the parameters using available data and previous work. According to 
our parameterization, labor receives sw = 75% of income. 16 percent of 
income is spent on housing. Another 16 percent is spent on local goods 
with prices collinear with housing, to simulate differences in costs-of-
living across cities in non-housing goods. We take 67 percent of our 
households to be itemizers, reflecting their share of income (the raw 
number is only 27 percent). 10 percent are assumed to be non-itemizers, 
with the remainder renting. The starting point for our elasticity of em-
ployment with respect to local taxes, ε, is taken at –6.0 from Bartik’s 
(1991) meta- analysis of the effect of local taxes on local levels of output 
and employment, controlling for local public spending. It is also con-
sistent with a fully calibrated model, seen in Albouy and Stuart (2014). 
As this value is crucial to the locational inefficiency measure, we also 
consider a conservative value of –1.0 as an alternative.
The marginal federal income tax rate on gross wages is 23.8% ac-
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cording to TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts 1993); this rate is comparable 
to the empirical tax findings. Adding the marginal payroll tax rate on 
both the employer and employee sides, net of additional Social Security 
benefits (Boskin et al. 1987), leads to a higher effective rate of 32.0%. At 
the state level, the average effective marginal tax rate on wages is 6.2 
percentage points, and ranges from 0 in Alaska to 9.0% in Minnesota.
To calculate the difference in user cost across cities in our sample we 
use the federal and state tax rates described above, excluding payroll 
taxes. We apply the tax on income, 
 
Y, differently than the tax rate that 
applies to deductions, 
 
D, according to state tax rules on allowance of 
the MID. For the property tax rate, 
 
P, we use the average rate reported 
at the city level by respondents of the 2007 American Community Sur-
vey. We use estimates from Anderson et al. (2007) for the share of mort-
gage exceeding current law MID limits.20 Following Poterba and Sinai, 
we assume a combined 2.5% maintenance and depreciation rate, and a 
risk premium of 2%. We use a mortgage interest rate,  rM, of 6%, re-
ported as the average interest rate on first lien mortgages for the stock 
of mortgages in 2007 by the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We 
also use the 2007 SCF to determine an average loan to value ratio of 
0.624.21 The risk free rate,  rT , is the 10 year Treasury bond yield in 2003. 
The primary difference between our parameterization and Poterba and 
Sinai (2008a) is that they use individual data from the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances to estimate marginal tax rates. They use these estimates 
to describe differences across income and age groups, whereas we are 
primarily interested in geographic differences. We also use the Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS) for property tax rate estimates, whereas 
they use the SCF, which does not differentiate across geography. In 
addition, we use an average capital gain   of 0.02, which we adjust 
slightly for local differences based on housing price changes between 
2000 and 2007. 
Our baseline assumption is that, on the margin, property taxes act 
mostly as excise taxes, so that  k = 0.25. We also show an alternative 
with  k = 1, which is the pure benefit case. We prefer  k = 0.25 based on 
the idea that property taxes discourage households from consuming 
housing more than they discourage them from consuming public ser-
vices. This appears to be largely true of public services such as educa-
tion, parks, and public safety, since their consumption depends mainly 
on the number of individuals, especially children, in the households 
that live in the community. The assumption appears less true for local 
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roads and fire protection, since smaller houses may require fewer roads 
and fewer firemen, although we expect such effects to be rather minor. 
We are also unaware of any evidence that property taxes cause house-
holds to have fewer children by making housing more expensive.22
Our estimates of local housing supply elasticities, 
 
 j
s, come from Saiz 
(2010), who estimates this parameter across metropolitan areas using 
 satellite- generated data on the slope of local terrain and presence of 
natural boundaries such as bodies of water and wetlands. For the com-
pensated housing demand price elasticity, we use 
 
cd = −0.5 (Polinsky 
and Ellwood, 1979), which is conservative relative to recent empirical 
estimates in Hanson and Martin (in press) and those used in other sim-
ulations (Poterba, 1992). We also use these elasticities to adjust estimates 
of local population responses  
j to differences in federal taxes, starting 
from the typical value of –6.0.
B. Wage and Housing Cost Differentials
Wage and housing price differentials are estimated using 1% samples 
of the American Community Survey from 2005 to 2009 from the Inte-
grated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Cities are defined at the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level using 1999 OMB definitions. 
Consolidated MSAs are treated as a single city (e.g., San Francisco in-
cludes Oakland and San Jose), as are the nonmetropolitan areas of each 
state. 
Interurban wage differentials are calculated from the logarithm of 
hourly wages for full- time workers, ages 25 to 55. We compute raw dif-
ferentials across areas and separate the effects explained by observable 
characteristics, using the residuals to explain the remaining difference. 
This is done by regressing log wages on city indicators, to identify the 
location effects, and an extensive set of controls—each fully interacted 
with gender—for education, experience, race, occupation, industry, 
and veteran, marital, and immigrant status, to identify the composi-
tion effects. The locational wage differentials correspond to those in the 
model and are interpreted as the causal effect of city j’s attributes on a 
worker’s wage. Identifying these differentials requires that workers do 
not sort across cities according to their unobserved skills.23
Housing values and gross rents reported in the census are used to 
calculate housing price differentials. To reduce measurement error from 
imperfect recall or rent control, the sample includes only units that 
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were acquired in the last ten years. Price differentials are separated into 
compositional and locational components, and are estimated in a man-
ner similar to wage differentials, using a regression of rents and values 
on flexible controls—interacted with tenure—for size, rooms, acreage, 
commercial use, kitchen and plumbing facilities, type and age of build-
ing, and the number of residents per room. Proper identification of 
housing cost differences requires that the average unobserved housing 
quality does not vary systematically across cities. 
Locational wage and housing cost differences across areas are graphed 
in figure 3.24 Panel A of table 1 reports the mean and standard devia-
tions of these differentials, which together with the figures, reveal that 
Fig. 3. Locational wage and housing costs across areas, 2007
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most of the average raw wage and housing cost differences across areas 
are not explainable by observable characteristics, but appear to be due 
to locational effects.
To check the accuracy of the calibrated model, we make compari-
sons to measured tax and deduction differentials across metropolitan 
areas using federal tax data from the IRS ZIP code files in Albouy and 
Hanson (2013). The IRS ZIP code files are ZIP code level data created 
from individual tax returns for 2007.25 The IRS ZIP code level data 
allow us to produce measured tax and deduction differences across 
metro areas by aggregating ZIP code level data to the state and metro-
politan area.26 The IRS data are beneficial for this purpose as they give 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Differences Across Areas, 2007
   
Mean 
(1)  
Std. Dev. 
(2)
Panel A: American Community Survey Data 2005- 2009
Standard deviation within MSA 0.706 0.042
Log housing cost differences:    
Raw 0.0 0.340
Standard deviation within MSA 0.706 0.042
Log housing cost differences:    
Raw 0.0 0.340
Predicted by location 0.0 0.345
Predicted by composition 0.0 0.045
Standard deviation within MSA 0.819 0.076
Effective property tax rate 0.010 0.004
Panel B: Statistics On Income Data per Capita
Filers 0.494 0.066
Adjusted gross income 27,766 7,457
Nonwage income 8,957 3,430
Taxes owed 3,722 1,505
Claiming mortgage interest deduction 0.267 0.068
Mortgage interest deduction if claimed 11,658 3,789
Panel C: Tax Data
Combined federal tax rate on labor 32.0%  
Reform federal tax rate on labor 29.3%  
State sales tax rate 5.5% 1.4%
State income tax rates  4.2%  2.4%
Notes: American Community Survey data for 325  metro- level observations, 
including 50 nonmetro areas of states. Means and standard deviations 
weighted by population. Statistics on Income data from tax year 2007 ZIP 
code level file. Panel C tax data from NBER TAXSIM. 
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actual tax payments and number of claims, but they do not allow us 
to control for composition differences in the population. For descrip-
tive purposes, Panel B of table 1 shows summary statistics for the IRS 
data aggregated to the metropolitan area level. The metro area aver-
age adjusted gross income for tax filers in our sample is $27,766 with 
a substantial standard deviation of $7,457. With the detail of the IRS 
data we can also see that about 27% of the tax filers in the sample claim 
the mortgage interest deduction with an average claim of $11,658. The 
standard deviation on the average mortgage interest deduction is sub-
stantial at $3,789.27
Fig. 4. Calibrated tax and deduction differentials
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IV. Simulation Results
A. Locational and Quantity Tax Distortions 
Figure 4 displays the tax differentials or locational wedges due to wage and 
housing cost differences across areas, according to equation (1): these are 
divided into the portion due to higher wages on the horizontal axis, and 
lower housing costs on the vertical axis. The solid line in the graph shows 
where the housing tax treatment differential would offset the wage- tax 
differential one for one. The size of a city’s total differential is determined 
by its distance to the right of or above this line (note the difference in scale). 
The standard deviations reported in table 2 reveal that location tax 
distortions due to housing benefits are indeed smaller than those due to 
wages. However, as seen in the dashed regression line in figure 4, they 
are negatively related, as places with higher wages have higher costs, 
and thus, benefit more from the tax- preferred status of housing, helping 
to offset the tax differential somewhat. If tax preferences for housing 
were eliminated, the average tax line in figure 3 would become vertical, 
as total tax differentials become wage- tax differentials. To the extent 
that general equilibrium effects can be ignored (our simulations predict 
they are small), this would increase the size of the total tax differentials. 
Table 3 reveals the average size of the housing  quantity- tax distor-
tions, expressed as an ad valorem subsidy to consumption. For item-
Table 2
Size of Locational Distortions Across Metro Areas, 2007
  
Standard 
Deviation 
(1)
Locational tax distortion  
Total distortion 0.026
Tax distortion from wages alone 0.035
Tax distortion from housing benefits alone 0.010
Total Tax Distortion after Simulated Reforms  
Eliminating mortgage interest deduction 0.027
Taxing capital gains on housing 0.028
Eliminating mortgage deduction and taxing capital gains 0.028
Tax distortion from wages alone with lower rates  0.032
Notes: We consider metropolitan areas as the unit of analysis as they represent ar-
eas where residents both live and work. The location distortion measures the im-
pact of taxes on choice of residence across metropolitan areas. The mean distor-
tion will be zero, and standard deviations represent movement across locations.
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izers, a neutral tax treatment would make the user cost 7.3%, although 
the actual user cost is typically 6.2%, a 17% reduction. If we consider the 
tax distortions individually, benefits in the income tax code create an ef-
fective ad valorem subsidy of 23% on average; property taxes without 
a deduction create an effective ad valorem tax of 6%. This is offset with 
the lack of sales taxes, which increase the average effective subsidy by 
3%. The net effects are generally smaller for nonitemizers, especially 
since they cannot itemize property taxes. However, they still benefit 
from having implicit rents untaxed, which in our sample are rather 
large, since nonitemizers have greater equity in their homes.
B. Simulated Effects of Tax Distortions across US Cities
Table 4 reports the size of the quantity effects across select metropolitan 
areas using variation in state and local taxes, as well as housing supply, 
which creates the variety of behavioral elasticities in column 1. The elas-
ticities imply that housing is more responsive to demand in cities like 
Houston and Greenville, than in Los Angeles and Miami. However, the 
consumption tax distortions in column 3 are sometimes larger in the 
less elastic cities, like San Francisco and Salt Lake City. This is due to 
these cities receiving particularly favorable tax treatment for their large 
Table 3
Housing Consumption Tax Distortions, 2007
Itemizers Non- Itemizers
  
Mean 
(1)  
Std. Dev. 
(2)  
Mean 
(3)  
Std. Dev. 
(4)
Panel A: User Cost of Housing
Actual tax treatment 0.062 0.003 0.068 0.004
Treatment similar to other capital 0.073 0.001 0.073 0.001
Panel B: Consumption Tax Distortion (Ad Valorem Subsidy to Housing)
Total effect of taxes 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.05
Effect of federal and state income taxes 0.23 0.01 0.23 0.02
Eliminating mortgage interest deduction 0.18 0.01 0.23 0.02
Taxing capital gains on housing 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.02
Eliminating mortgage deduction and taxing 
capital gains 0.14 0.01 0.19 0.02
Effect of property taxes (no deduction) –0.06 0.05 – 0.06 0.05
Sales tax effect  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01
Notes: User cost of housing calculated as in equations (4) and (5). Ad valorem subsidy for 
housing calculated as in equation (3).
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capital gains. In the grouping in column 6, we predict that housing con-
sumption per capita is as much as 7% higher because of tax preferences 
in Oklahoma City, while it remains nearly unchanged in Miami due to 
the small elasticity. On average, the typical house is 4% larger.
Table 4 also reports the predicted effects of location distortions across 
these metro areas. Population effects are determined by the standard 
deviation of the tax differentials and the elasticity of population, re-
ported in column 2, which varies because of local elasticities in hous-
ing supply. The population effects must average out to zero as they are 
 population- weighted, and have a large standard deviation of 16%. This 
means an area with a tax differential of one positive standard deviation, 
or 2.6% of income, has a long- run population level 16% lower than it 
would under a geographically neutral tax system; the opposite is true 
of areas with negative differentials, which may be seen as subsidies.28 
C. Efficiency Cost of Tax Distortions
Table 5 presents the efficiency costs of tax benefits to housing using the 
calibrated model and data under a variety of modeling scenarios. In our 
benchmark case, the deadweight loss from locational inefficiency amounts 
to about $26 billion per year, or 0.22% of income as shown in table 5. The 
overall efficiency cost of tax subsidies for housing is calculated in table 4 for 
our benchmark case and several alternatives. On average, we find that the 
typical household consumes housing at a rate approximately 4% above the 
efficient level (assuming there are no positive externalities from consuming 
more housing), creating a welfare loss of $7 billion, or 0.06% of income. 
If property taxes are entirely benefit taxes, they do not push houses to 
be small. In this case, reported in column 2, houses are on average 7.4% 
too large, and the deadweight loss from quantity inefficiency increases 
to $19 billion or 0.16% of income. If we ignore the reduction in tax bur-
dens due to the deductibility of property taxes, this would reduce loca-
tional inefficiency very slightly. 
In column 3, we ignore the tax benefits given to capital gains in hous-
ing; the deadweight loss in location inefficiency increases to $30 billion, 
or 0.25% of income. This is because places with higher wages benefit 
most from this exemption. Looking at quantity inefficiency, this de-
creases, since households have less of an incentive to invest in housing. 
Ignoring state income and sales taxes would also produce smaller mea-
sures of inefficiency, since these taxes generally exacerbate preexisting 
distortions. The effects are generally rather small. 
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Naturally, the locational deadweight loss is sensitive to the elasticity 
of population: if we use –1 for all of the cities, deadweight loss falls to 
only $4 billion, or 0.04% of income. Assuming a compensated price elas-
ticity of –1 across cities (say with perfectly elastic supply across cities), 
results in houses being 13% too large, and tripling the deadweight loss 
from quantity inefficiency.
Our benchmark estimates of the efficiency costs in housing quantity 
are smaller than Poterba (1992) who estimates in 1990 that housing is 
overconsumed by between 12.4% and 23.2%, depending on taxpayer in-
come. Our estimates are smaller due to lower interest rates, lower mar-
ginal tax rates, and a lower compensated demand elasticity (Poterba 
chooses –0.80). Furthermore, we treat the property tax as distortionary 
in the opposite direction and incorporate finite supply elasticities. Even 
when we use a similar elasticity to Poterba (1992), our results are about 
half the size of his estimates.
D. The Simulated Effects of Federal Tax Reforms 
Table 6 reports the simulated effect of several federal tax reforms, such 
as eliminating housing tax deductions, eliminating the capital gains ex-
emption, or indexing taxes to local  costs- of- living and wage levels.29 
Column 1 reports that eliminating the mortgage interest and property 
tax deductions would lower quantity inefficiency costs from 0.06% to 
0.03% of income. This would be offset by a slight rise in location inef-
ficiency costs. The net effect would be to reduce the total deadweight 
loss by about $4 billion a year. 
Taxing capital gains on housing would produce no net efficiency im-
provement, since the reduction in quantity efficiency would be offset by 
an equally large increase in location efficiency. If deductions are already 
eliminated, taxing capital gains appears to make the economy slightly 
less efficient.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that repealing all of the tax advan-
tages of housing would lead to greater total deadweight loss than the 
existing tax system. Quantity inefficiencies fall from 0.06% to 0.2%, as 
households consume houses that are inefficiently small. Meanwhile, the 
locational inefficiency would rise substantially, from 0.22% to 0.39% of 
income, as households in high- wage productive areas would no longer 
receive tax breaks for their higher housing costs.
One possible shortcoming of these simulations is that they hold tax 
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rates fixed. If total revenues remained constant, marginal tax rates on la-
bor income could be reduced when housing tax benefits are eliminated. If 
we were to do this, we find that this would improve locational efficiency 
substantially relative to the scenario with no rate cuts. Even with these im-
provements, the overall costs are still higher than in the benchmark case.
These static simulations so far suggest that the most efficient policy 
would be to eliminate the housing and property tax deductions. As we 
mentioned earlier, it may be more efficient to completely undo the pref-
erential treatment of housing, and to index income to local costs of liv-
ing or wages. We do this in columns 6 and 7, cutting rates to take into 
account the tax savings from taxing housing more heavily. Indexing 
income to local costs of living would indeed lead to higher overall effi-
ciency: houses would be only slightly too small, due to the property tax, 
and would be disproportionately located in high  quality- of- life areas. 
The overall cost would be only 0.17% of income. With an ideal wage in-
dexation, the location inefficiencies would be eliminated entirely, lead-
ing to the most efficient outcome.
The policy change simulations are sensitive to alternative calibrations 
(e.g., using different elasticities). Nonetheless, indexing income taxes to 
local wage levels and eliminating the housing tax preferences is still the 
reform that reduces deadweight loss the most. It is worth noting that 
our model does not consider the interaction between housing tax ben-
efits and the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Presumably, the presence 
of the AMT would reduce the size of the changes we estimate, as filers 
subject to the AMT are already subject to rollbacks on most deductions.30
V. Conclusion
Housing tax benefits affect not only the quantity of housing people con-
sume, but where that housing is located. Furthermore, tax benefits in 
the income tax code must be framed relative to other distortions. In af-
fecting the quantity of housing, benefits work against the property tax, 
more than correcting it, causing houses to be too large rather than too 
little. In affecting the location of housing, benefits work to help locate 
workers in high- cost areas. Since high- cost areas tend to be high- wage 
areas, they typically help to correct the disincentive created by the tax 
code to live and work in high- wage areas. In this case, benefits to hous-
ing are much smaller than the effect they work against. 
An upshot of these other distortions is the somewhat surprising con-
clusion that housing benefits are not as distortionary as previous anal-
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ysis suggests. Reducing benefits improves quantity efficiency, but the 
value of this improvement is somewhat small, mainly because of limited 
elasticity in the demand and supply of housing. Furthermore, if mar-
ginal tax rates are not reduced, location decisions will be made less effi-
cient. If the population truly is very responsive to these differences over 
the long run, these efficiency costs may be quite high, since they cause 
workers to work in areas where they are less productive.
While we find housing-tax benefits make location choices more effi-
cient, this does not negate other arguments for policy reform. These de-
ductions (especially for mortgage interest) have long been criticized for 
being expensive, regressive, and not well targeted to their stated goal 
of subsidizing home ownership. These criticisms all have their merit. 
It is also important to raise the point that gains to locational efficiency 
from housing tax benefits could be reproduced and applied to a larger 
fraction of the population by indexing taxable income to local cost of 
living. Such a system could be improved by adjusting costs for local 
quality of life, which would be equivalent to indexing by local wage 
levels.  Lastly, we should state that there many other distortions that 
may cause houses to be too big or people to live in the wrong place, 
such as subsidized transportation costs and fiscal zoning. We leave such 
interesting dimensions to future research. 
Endnotes
For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and disclosure of the authors’ mate-
rial financial relationships, if any, please see http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13054.ack.
1. Homeowners can also deduct up to $100,000 in home equity secured debt, effec-
tively pushing the lending cap to $1.1 million.
2. See Burman and Phaup (2012) for a discussion of how much additional revenue 
would actually be collected if these and other tax expenditures were eliminated. They 
point out that revenue depends on the behavioral response of taxpayers and the interac-
tion with other aspects of the tax code (rates, itemization, and other deductions).
3. All dollar amounts of tax expenditure come from the “Analytical Perspectives, 
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2013” and reflect estimates of the 
foregone revenue from 2014 tax collection.
4. The purchase of materials for home improvements is taxed, but labor that is put into 
home improvements is not taxed.
5. The Commission suggested transforming the mortgage interest deduction to a 12% 
tax credit limited to mortgages less than $500,000. The Commission also recommended 
eliminating itemized deductions, which would include the deduction for property taxes 
paid. Green and Vandell (1999) simulate the effects of a revenue neutral change from the 
mortgage interest and property tax deductions to a housing tax credit and find that such 
a policy would increase aggregate home ownership rates. 
6. Percent of tax filers claiming the MID is calculated using 2011 IRS statistics of in-
come tables for total number of tax returns and number of returns that include an MID 
claim. The 2011 tax year represents a low point in MID claims for the last 5 years, with the 
claim rate reaching as high as 28.5% of tax filers in 2007. 
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7. Previous studies consider how eliminating deductions would affect revenues and 
incentives (Poterba and Sinai, 2011), as well as the user cost of housing (Anderson et al. 
2007, Poterba and Sinai 2008), how switching to a consumption based tax would impact 
the housing market in general (Bruce and Holtz- Eakin, 1999), and how housing might be 
treated by a national retail sales tax (Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba 1997).
8. This figure is substantially smaller than recent estimates in Hanson and Martin (in 
press) that account for the full range of housing consumption distortions by examining 
the effect of mortgage interest deductibility on the amount of mortgage interest deducted. 
They estimate the annual deadweight loss from housing consumption to be $16–36 billion. 
9.  We then are just modeling firms that produce tradable goods. This simplification 
works well when housing is made with land and mobile capital, without labor. Albouy 
(2009a, 2009b) presents a fuller model. He demonstrates that when cities are good at 
producing housing, the model will produce the opposite effect on prices and wages than 
when they are good at producing tradable goods. Without land prices, the two are ob-
servationally impossible to disentangle, but for the purpose of examining tax policy, this 
assumption does not affect the model’s predictions.
10. This is not exactly true with either a progressive or regressive tax, but we can easily 
redefine an “average city” as one paying an amount of taxes without much loss of gener-
ality. Alternatively, we may assume that tax revenues are redistributed in equal lump sum 
payments, and define an average city as one that pays on net zero dollars to the federal 
government.
11. By symmetry, presumably there is also a lower productivity city than Nashville, 
which will gain population, and see housing prices and wages rise. The wage predictions 
rely on the assumption that there are fixed factors in production and that agglomeration 
economies in production are fairly weak.
12. If this indexation scheme applied to all workers then the equilibrium would move 
back to  E0
C In this. case, the index would need to take into account the change in equilib-
rium wages.
13. A similar argument holds for neighborhoods within a city. If wage earners face 
equal commute times in Arlington and Bethesda, but Bethesda offers better quality of life, 
then tax benefits will artificially inflate housing prices and population numbers there. As 
noted by Wildasin (1986), taxes on labor lower the value of time of workers, causing them 
to commute for too long, leading to sprawl. Tax benefits to housing may mitigate this ef-
fect by increasing the amount of investment into structures located more centrally. This 
may be seen by taking the opposite results of Brueckner and Kim (2003) for the property 
tax, which they find would differentially reduce investments in central structures. It is 
unclear whether this effect would reduce sprawl, since subsidies increase the demand 
for those structures. In addition, denser multifamily buildings that tend to be located 
centrally are usually rented and thus do not benefit from housing tax benefits like the 
mortgage interest and property tax deductions (see Glaeser 2011).
14. We do not consider other fees that may act like taxes on a home purchase, such 
as closing costs due at the time of purchase. In general, the fraction of closing costs that 
represent fees that act like taxes is small compared to those that represent services. Title 
search and insurance fees typically represent the largest portion of closing costs, which of-
fer buyers the service of ensuring that there are no other liens, easements, or other restric-
tions on the property—a service to buyers. Treatment of closing costs varies in the litera-
ture from being considered part of the equity financed portion of the user cost (Genesove 
and Mayer, 1997) to being a separate parameter affecting housing supply (Yinger, 1981).
15. See Rosen (1979a, 1979b, 1985), Poterba (1984, 1992), Green and Vandell (1999), 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003), Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), and Anderson et al. 
(2007) for variants of the user- cost model. 
16. Berkovoc and Fullerton (1992) model tax incentives in general equilibrium setting 
and present evidence that ownership is determined primarily by demographics, while the 
amount of housing consumed depends on its relative price. They demonstrate that taxing 
imputed rent reduces undiversified risk faced by households, and can actually increase 
home ownership rates.
17. Our simulations account for differences in state mortgage interest deductibility.
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18. The literature on the behavioral response to property taxes focuses on the mobil-
ity (Fox, Herzog, and Schlottman (1989), O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin (1995), Knapp, 
White, and Clark (2001), Shan (2010)), property improvement (Oates and Schwab (1997), 
Anderson (2008), and urban sprawl (Song and Zenou (2006), Banzhaf and Lavery (2010)). 
See Deskins and Fox (2008) for a recent review of the literature on the behavioral response 
to property taxation; there is also an extensive empirical literature on the relationship 
between property tax and home values. See Palmon and Smith (1998) for an excellent 
example and Sirmans, Gatzlaff, and Macpherson (2008) for a recent review of the capi-
talization literature.
19. In our simulations, tax rates include both state and federal income taxes.
20. We use the variation across cities in their sample for all caps. They use data on 
actual mortgages originated in 2003 to calculate values of the s parameter. 
21. The loan to value ratio is the average family holdings of debt on mortgages 
($149,500) plus the debt holdings on home equity lines of credit ($39,200). We divide this 
by the average asset value of primary residence ($302,400). 
22. If anything, we might guess that higher property tax rates increase the amount of 
local redistribution through public services from households with no or few children to 
households with many children.
23. In reality, workers do not all have the same endowments and tastes or pay the same 
marginal tax rate, nor are they equally sensitive to productivity differences. However, as 
shown in Albouy (2008b), workers with different tastes and endowments can be aggre-
gated without serious complications, so long as each is weighted by their share of income 
(which we do, although it has little impact on the estimates). 
24. Appendix Figure A1 displays wage and housing cost differences explained by ob-
servable worker and housing composition.
25. These data are generated from the universe (the Individual Master File System) of 
all Form 1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ filed with the IRS between January 1, 2008, and Decem-
ber 31, 2008. The IRS determines the ZIP code of each taxpayer using what is reported on 
tax forms, and does not make any attempt to correct invalid ZIP codes or impute missing 
ZIP codes. ZIP codes with fewer than ten returns are not included in the data. 
26. We allocate ZIP code areas to MSAs and nonmetro areas of states using the 
MABLE/GeoCorr2K database available online at: http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/
geocorr2k.html. The majority of ZIP codes (over 83%) have complete overlap with an 
MSA or nonmetro area; we allocate the IRS ZIP code data for ZIP codes with partial over-
lap to MSAs based on the population overlap between the two areas.
27. As predicted, we found the relationship between taxes and wage levels to be 
positive and convex, reflecting progressivity in the tax code. The slope of this relation-
ship is 0.252 at the average, which is statistically indistinguishable from the calibrated 
tax rate of 0.238. This shows that on average, our calibration fits the measured data 
quite well. 
28. If estimated rather than calibrated tax differentials are used, this increases to 17%.
29. We do not run simulations for taxing imputed rents. We found that incorporating 
the taxation of imputed rent could actually decrease the user cost of housing using the 
fomula provided by Poterba and Sinai (2011). This is because of their conclusion that 
user costs are reduced even further from capital gains and the implicit tax subsidy to 
the mortgage premium, due to prepayment and foreclosure risk. We are less sure these 
conclusions would hold in a more general equilibrium setting. 
30. Our reforms do not take into account changes in extensive and intensive labor 
supply from labor market participation and hours worked. Simply eliminating the tax 
benefits to housing should in principle lower (compensated) labor supply, since the return 
to working and buying housing consumption should fall. A compensating tax cut on la-
bor income should undo this labor supply response, and possibly push it in a positive di-
rection by increasing consumption efficiency. This ignores the complementarity between 
housing and leisure. Presumably, housing and leisure are complements, since housing 
should aid in (or require) household production by making it more desirable to cook at 
home and do housework for a larger house. In that case, reducing housing quantities 
could improve efficiency in the labor market by lowering the value of leisure. Following 
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the insight of Corlett and Hague (1953), it would then be efficient to tax housing more 
heavily than other goods, which are less of a complement to leisure.
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Appendix
Fig. A1. Compositional wage and housing costs across areas, 2007
